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Dear Reader,
A mentor once told me that the most important time to recruit talent is when you least have time to do so. 
I suppose the same can be said for case-writing. The most critical time to share experiences is when many 
partners struggle together to implement a shared vision. Indeed, the dual innovations of Pay for Success 
(PFS) contracting and Social Impact Bond (SIB) financing have captured the imaginations of an awful lot 
of people in government, philanthropy, impact investing, management consulting, think tanks, the legal 
profession, the accounting profession, mainstream banking, social service provision and the media.  
With so much happening all at once, it is no surprise that those interested in the field often feel confused 
and ill-informed.  And so, even though this case study merely reflects the early days of Pay for Success pilot 
development in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and even though a great deal of what we share will 
evolve as negotiations move forward, we thought it worthwhile to lift our heads up from the day to day and 
relate some of the experiences we have had to date.
If there is any critical takeaway for those working in this nascent industry so far, it is this:  as the Boy Scouts 
say… BE PREPARED!
We hope the case will help to make this clear. It takes a tremendous amount of work to put a PFS/SIB deal 
into place. So much needs to be just right:  a rigorous way to evaluate impact, a strong cost-benefit analysis, 
a service provider that can scale with quality, government partners that are willing (and able) to engage 
deeply, investors and boards that have an appetite to understand and embrace new financial constructs, and 
last but not least, a willingness by all parties to communicate, communicate, communicate as the multi-
party problem-solving process tumbles forward.
Truly, if Pay for Success and Social Impact Bond Financing weren’t such incredibly promising ideas, no one 
in their right minds would be doing all of this hard work.  But we believe the promise is undeniably there. 
For fifteen years, the social impact sector has been talking about measuring “social returns” -- now we have 
a potential mechanism to actually do so. For fifteen years, we have been talking about how social investors 
don’t have a way to “exit” successful investments -- now we have an opportunity to create onramps to large-
scale government funding streams.  And for fifteen years we’ve been talking about harnessing “blended 
value” asset classes that tap into philanthropic and return-seeking investor dollars – Social Impact Bonds are 
a promising way to make that dream come true, too.  
At Third Sector Capital Partners, our mission is to accelerate America’s transition to a performance-driven 
social sector. If you share that vision, we hope you will enjoy this case study and encourage others to pursue 
the levels of hard work and attention to detail that it describes.
Many thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation for generously supporting the write up of this case study, and for 
its long-term commitment to promoting the development of the social impact sector. 
Kind regards,
George Overholser
Co-Founder & CEO, Third Sector Capital Partners
A Letter from our Co-Founder & CEO
Third Sector Capital Partners
The Challenge
Massachusetts, like many other states and 
municipalities across the US, is grappling with 
a tremendous challenge: With increasingly 
strained budgets and growing social need, how can 
government funding be directed towards evidence-
based programs that offer demonstrated cost-savings? 
Pay for Success and Social Impact Bonds (PFS/SIB) 
have emerged as potential mechanisms for making 
smart investments in effective social interventions by 
changing the way Government allocates and invests 
its resources – focusing on results and outcomes. In 
short, funding what works.
  
In May 2011, Massachusetts issued a Request for 
Information (RFI) with the goal of helping the 
Commonwealth determine “the areas of government 
activity where success-based-contracting strategies 
have the potential to improve outcomes and/or reduce 
costs.” The Justice System is one area of government 
activity with the potential to illustrate both improved 
outcomes and well-defined cost savings for the 
Commonwealth. In addition, Massachusetts has a 
variety of established service providers that offer 
preventative initiatives to populations involved with 
the Justice System, particularly young people. One 
of these successful and well-known providers, Roca, 
had worked with Third Sector Capital Partners (Third 
Sector) for a year and a half to prepare itself to be a 
successful candidate for this PFS/SIB opportunity. 
After reviewing the RFI submissions and preparing 
for the next steps of the procurement process, 
Massachusetts issued two Requests for Responses 
(RFR), one regarding youth services/reducing 
incarceration rates and the other regarding 
homelessness and reducing Medicaid and shelter 
expenses. Multiple organizations were preparing to 
respond to the solicitation, with varying degrees of 
programmatic detail. In considering a response to the 
youth services/justice RFR, much of Third Sector and 
Roca’s work were organized around eight key criteria:
• Government leadership to address and 
spearhead a public/private innovation.
• Social needs that are unmet, high-priority and 
large-scale.
• Target populations that are well-defined and 
can be measured with scientific rigor.
• Proven outcomes from administrative data 
that is credible and readily available in a cost 
effective means.
• Interventions that are highly likely to achieve 
targeted impact goals.
• Proven service providers that are prepared to 
scale with quality.
• Safeguards to protect the well-being of 
populations served.
• Cost effective programs that can demonstrate 
fiscal savings for Government.
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This case study examines Roca and Third Sector’s 
approach to examining these criteria as they 
prepared to respond to the RFR. Service providers 
like Roca must invest time and thought in the pre-
feasibility stage in order to be adequately prepared 
to successfully pursue a PFS/SIB opportunity or 
government procurement. On August 1, 2012, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts moved forward 
with its Pay for Success initiatives by announcing the 
selection of Third Sector to serve as lead intermediary, 
in partnership with Roca and New Profit Inc., for a 
youth recidivism project.1 Massachusetts was the 
first state in the nation to pursue a competitive 
procurement process for Pay for Success.
Pay for Success and Social Impact Bonds have emerged as potential 
mechanisms for making investments in effective social interventions 
by changing the way Government allocates and invests its resources – 
focusing on results and outcomes. 
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It is the relentlessness of a youth who shows up day after day no matter what that awakens hope in a young person.
1 Massachusetts First State in the Nation to Announce Initial Successful Bidders for ‘Pay for Success’ Contracts. August 1, 2012. Available at: http://
www.mass.gov/anf/press-releases/fy2013/massachusetts-first-state-in-the-nation-to-announce-ini.html
Pay for Success is a general term for performance-
based contracting between Government and 
providers of social services. Under this construct, 
Government pays when results are achieved as 
opposed to providing up-front and on-going 
payments for services. Social Impact Bonds are one 
potential financing option to support Pay for Success 
programs. They are not actually bonds. A Social 
Impact Bond brings together Government, service 
providers and investors to implement existing and 
proven programs designed to accomplish clearly 
defined outcomes. Investors provide the initial 
capital support and the Government agrees to make 
payments to the project, and therefore investors, only 
when outcomes are achieved.
Pay for Success/Social Impact Bond constructs are 
framed around several key principles:
1. Government, lead contractor and investors 
agree on targeted outcomes for a societal 
issue, for example, reducing recidivism or 
homelessness. 
2. Government and lead contractor or 
intermediary enter a multi-year contract, 
in which the Government agrees to pay 
lead contractor or intermediary if targeted 
outcomes are achieved.  
3. Private and/or philanthropic investors 
provide the necessary up-front capital to lead 
contractor to fund the program.
4. Lead contractor orchestrates the delivery of 
the social intervention via subcontracts with 
service provider(s).
Pay for Success and 
Social Impact Bonds
Exhibit 1: Pay for Success Cash Flows
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5. An independent evaluator monitors 
performance against agreed-upon benchmarks.
6. Lead contractor receives payments from 
Government only if targeted social outcomes 
are achieved, then repays investors or reinvests 
in programs.
Benefits
In many cases, Pay for Success programs will not 
only achieve positive social outcomes, but also 
create fiscal savings for Government. This double-
benefit makes Pay for Success politically attractive 
to multiple stakeholders. For example, $250 million 
of investments towards preventative programs that 
reduce recidivism might eventually make it possible 
to close prisons that cost taxpayers $1 billion per year 
to run. Other benefits of Pay for Success include:2
• Government funds impact and programs that 
work.
• Focus on social outcomes that change lives
• Reposition government spending to 
preventative programs.
• Attract new forms of capital to the nonprofit 
sector.
• Independent evaluation creates transparency 
for all parties.
• Shift and share risk of nonperformance from 
Government to private investors.
Risks
Pay for Success initiatives do come with a variety of 
risks. All stakeholders must be aware of the possible 
risks inherent in these initiatives as well as risk 
mitigation and management strategies. As Pay for 
Success develops, it will become easier to reduce and 
appropriately allocate risk for all parties involved. 
Several of these risks include:
• Lead contractor or service provider 
non-performance.
• Lack of clarity and/or ability to measure social 
outcomes.
• Non-rigorous evaluation methodologies.
• Government data unavailable for cost effective 
evaluations.
• Insufficient rate of return for funders and 
providers.
Additional literature on Pay for Success and Social 
Impact Bond theory and practice is available through 
the Center for American Progress, Nonprofit Finance 
Fund and McKinsey and Co.3  The remainder of 
this case will focus on one provider, Roca, Inc. and 
its experience with Third Sector Capital Partners 
conducting due diligence and exploring the Pay for 
Success concept. The goal of the work discussed in 
this case was to determine if it was feasible for Roca 
to participate in a Pay for Success procurement, 
and ultimately, contracting process with the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. At the time this 
case study went to print, Roca and Third Sector were 
still negotiating final contracting terms.
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2 McKinsey & Company. From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the US. 2012.
3 Please visit www.americanprogress.org, www.payforsuccess.org, and http://mckinseyonsociety.com/social-impact-bonds/ for more information.
“Pay for Success programs will not only achieve positive social outcomes, 
but also create fiscal savings for Government. This double-benefit makes 
Pay for Success politically attractive to multiple stakeholders.” 
The Problem 
and Opportunity
Every year, approximately 4,000 high-risk young 
people “age out” of the juvenile justice system or 
are on adult probation in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. According to the Commonwealth 55% 
return to prison one or more times within three years 
of release. The Pew Center for the States estimates 
that it costs Massachusetts an average of $47,000 
to incarcerate a prisoner for a year.4  Since each of 
these reoffenders spends an average of 28 months 
in a correctional facility over this time horizon5, this 
population generates over $300 million in additional 
incarceration expenses for the Commonwealth.
Innovative social programs exist that can help these 
young people move away from criminal involvement. 
But all too often, these programs are underfunded 
and subscale. Tight budgets make state governments 
wary of putting taxpayer dollars at risk for new 
initiatives, while one-year budget cycles make it 
difficult to finance long-term, preventative measures. 
Meanwhile, without good metrics to shine a light on 
impact performance, other less effective programs 
continue to soak up a majority of government funding.
Within this fiscal environment, Massachusetts 
offered few successful options for redirecting the 
lives of youth with high risk factors, such as previous 
arrests and school truancy, that make them more 
likely to re-enter the justice system. These young 
people are in the “deep end” and in desperate need of 
innovative, scalable and proven social interventions.
“According to the Commonwealth, 55% return to prison one or more 
times within three years of release, costing the Commonwealth on 
average $47,000 per prisoner per year.” 
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4 In preparing the RFR response, Roca and Third Sector relied on information provided by the Commonwealth in both the official Request for 
Responses as well as answers provided by the Commonwealth to submitted RFR Questions. The Pew Center for the States.  1 in 31:  The Long 
Reach of American Corrections in Massachusetts. (2011). The actual budgetary savings from reducing the number of prisoners could be much 
lower than $47,000 because there are fixed costs that could not be eliminated without closing entire facilities. 
5 Department of Youth Services Internal Analysis. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2012. 
Given the intensive nature of Roca’s 
Intervention Model, it was important 
that Roca has been preparing itself to 
scale for the past several years and that 
the Massachusetts RFR directly aligns 
with Roca’s Strategic Business Plan.
Roca
The mission of Chelsea, MA based Roca is to help 
disengaged, disenfranchised young people move out 
of violence and poverty. Since its inception in 1988, 
Roca has helped more than 17,000 young people make 
positive, profound changes in their lives, creating 
a nationally acclaimed model of transformational 
relationships as a vehicle for youth development. 
Roca has spent nearly seven years looking at 
evidence-based practices and programs in an effort 
to more effectively serve their communities’ highest 
risk young men who, without an intervention, face 
a reality of jail, violence, and poverty.  Due to the 
lack of programs focused specifically on this target 
population, Roca felt the need to create an effective 
intervention model that consistently drives this 
group of young men toward positive outcomes.
With these goals in mind, Roca has developed and 
operates an Intervention Model designed to help the 
most high-risk young people break the destructive 
cycles of poverty, violence and perpetual incarcera-
tion. The Intervention Model  pushes young people 
to identify, confront and overcome destructive be-
haviors and learn the skills needed to re-engage and 
succeed in society, education, and the economy. 
Roca’s Intervention Model is based on the combined 
principles of cognitive re-structuring, skills develop-
ment, motivational interviewing, and transitional 
employment.
Roca’s Intervention Model enables young people to 
transform their lives and move toward the outcomes 
of economic independence (successfully keeping a 
job) and living out of harm’s way (with a primary fo-
cus of staying out of prison).   Building off of Roca’s 
success to date and pulling from evidence-based 
practices in behavioral health, criminal justice and 
workforce development, the Intervention Model 
includes two years of intensive programming with 
two additional years of follow up for retention and 
sustainability. 
Roca’s High Risk Youth Intervention Model is one pos-
sible intervention with success in redirecting “deep 
end” youth. Like many other nonprofits, Roca was in 
need of new financial tools that could enable it to in-
crease funding and expand impact. But would Roca 
be able to scale its successful programs in a sustain-
able way while also delivering an attractive cost sav-
ings proposition for Massachusetts? And how would 
Roca prepare itself to be a strong and well-prepared 
candidate for future Pay for Success opportunities?
Roca and 
Third Sector 
Capital Partners
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“Third Sector is a nonprofit financial advisory firm and intermediary 
seeking to accelerate America’s transition to 
a performance driven social sector.”
Third Sector Capital Partners
Soon after the Massachusetts’s Pay for Success and 
Social Impact Bond (PFS/SIB) procurement was 
announced in May 2011, Molly Baldwin, the Founder 
and Executive Director of Roca, met with Third 
Sector Capital Partners regarding the opportunity. 
Founded in 2010, Third Sector is a nonprofit financial 
advisory firm and intermediary seeking to accelerate 
America’s transition to a performance driven social 
sector. Third Sector has risen to become a leading 
practioner in implementing social innovation 
financing in the United States. Third Sector provides 
a variety of advisory and project structuring services 
for Government, service providers, investors and 
project intermediaries considering or pursuing PFS, 
SIB and growth capital initiatives. 
Third Sector is actively involved in advancing PFS 
and other social finance innovations with partners 
in localities across the United States, including 
Cuyahoga County, OH, Santa Clara County, CA and 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. “Roca needed 
help in unpacking the ‘black box’ of the components 
of Pay for Success and Social Impact Bonds. Service 
providers will need to pursue opportunities to 
exchange ideas with outside, impartial organizations 
about the concept’s potential,” Molly Baldwin 
commented. “We appreciated Third Sector’s 
financial and evaluation experience as much as 
their willingness to learn from Roca’s history and 
programmatic expertise.” After submitting their 
RFI, Roca decided to engage with Third Sector more 
deeply to provide advice and technical assistance 
to help the organization prepare for an impending 
request for responses from the Commonwealth.  
8
Social Innovation Financing Case Study: Preparing for Pay for Success Opportunities
Roca engages young people where they are in the 
stages of change cognitively and behaviorally. By 
applying this evidence-based framework in the 
program delivery, young people move along a 
pathway of education, pre-vocational training, life 
skills, transitional employment and unsubsidized 
employment opportunities. 
From Concept 
to Proposal
As experts in the PFS/SIB field, Third Sector would 
help Roca (a) evaluate the merits of PFS/SIB as it 
relates to Roca’s mission and strategy, (b) analyze 
Roca’s operations, economics, scalability, evidence 
of impact, financial outlook, and other factors 
through the lens of a possible PFS/SIB, (c) design an 
integrated PFS/SIB structure, (d) identify and recruit 
evaluation experts, funders and other partners into 
the proposed collaboration, and (e) prepare detailed 
responses to a Request For Responses (RFR) issued by 
the Commonwealth.  
“This process was  instrumental to our understanding 
of Pay for Success and how it would affect Roca’s 
management and business model moving forward,” 
Baldwin stated.  “Their partnership with us produced 
more than an RFR response, it changed the way that 
we do business and manage our organization to 
performance.” 
Roca’s journey from concept to concrete PFS/SIB 
proposal was marked by several success factors. 
The first ingredient, dedication to performance-
based management, had been a key tenant of the 
Roca organization since its 2005 Theory of Change 
process, many years before Pay for Success. Roca’s 
Theory of Change process took the nonprofit 
through an intensive examination that clarified 
its target population and intended outcomes, as 
well as identified and integrated the programmatic 
components and organizational infrastructure 
necessary to achieve those outcomes. Roca’s efforts to 
implement its Theory of Change led the organization 
through significant modifications and two more 
theory of change processes to refine the model and 
organizational focus (with the last theory of change 
taking place in October 2011).
“Roca’s journey to becoming a high-performing, 
effective nonprofit started many years ago when it 
began asking a critical question—Are we helping 
young people change their lives and how do we know? 
After realizing that, in spite of great dedication and 
hard work, Roca was not helping young people change 
behaviors to improve their lives to a significant degree, 
Roca engaged in a systemic cycle of research, design, 
action, tracking data, and use of data for continuous 
improvement to deliver an intervention worthy of the 
young people we serve.”6  
Since 2005, Roca has further clarified its model and 
target population, practiced performance-based 
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“Dedication to performance-based management had been 
a key tenet of Roca since its 2005 Theory of Change process, 
many years before Pay for Success.” 
6  Roca’s Performance Benchmark and Outcomes Report. 2012. Available at: www.rocainc.org
management and implemented stage based 
programming to increase outcomes for the young 
people it serves. The organization’s commitment 
to young people extended beyond the first site in 
Chelsea to a new location, Springfield MA, in 2010. 
Roca’s experience with replication in Springfield 
demonstrated not only a willingness to scale, 
but also a successful example of implementation 
through partnership and collaboration without 
sacrificing organizational commitment to measuring 
performance. This evidence of an ability to scale while 
maintaining programmatic fidelity was paramount to 
support participation in a Pay for Success pilot.
Given its longstanding commitment to performance 
and successful replication, Roca was well-prepared 
to take advantage of the Pay for Success opportunity 
in Massachusetts. However, the Roca team did not 
understand the nuances of the concept, or fully grasp 
what participation could mean for the organization. 
Over the nine months between the Massachusetts 
Request for Information and Request for Responses, 
Roca worked with Third Sector to understand the ways 
that Pay for Success could impact the organization’s 
budget and business model, impact measurement 
and growth strategies for the future. 
Even though Roca staff already had a deep 
understanding of their economics, the Third Sector 
team helped them quantify their programmatic cost 
per success and the trade-offs between expected 
cash flows from entering into an outcomes-
based performance contract versus existing cost-
reimbursement government contracts. Third Sector 
also assisted Roca in exploring how, if successful, 
the organization could use performance-based 
payments as a way to make government funding 
a more significant component of Roca’s revenue 
model. “We might have put in a response without 
Third Sector,” Molly said. “But there is no way we 
would have understood how to operationalize this 
financial mechanism without assistance from an 
outside organization.”
• Existing dedication to performance-based 
management and use of data to drive 
towards outcomes.
• Demonstrated experience with replication 
to new geographies.
• Commitment to understanding the 
organization’s economics and Pay For 
Success with Third Sector over nine months 
between RFI and RFP.
• Use of Pay for Success methodology to 
strategically change the organization’s 
revenue model.
•  An unwavering commitment to improving 
results for the population served.
Roca’s Critical Success Factors
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“Since 2005, Roca has further clarified its model and target population, 
practiced performance-based management and implemented stage 
based programming to increase outcomes for 
the young people it serves.”
Massachusetts 
Request for Response 
Overview
The RFR issued by the State sought service providers 
that could achieve proven reductions in the rate 
of incarceration among young people leaving the 
juvenile corrections system. For four years (flanked by 
a one year ramp up and one year wrap up) a selected 
lead contractor would be asked to coordinate and/or 
deliver services to a target population. The contract 
would provide no up-front compensation, but for each 
foregone incarceration achieved, the State estimated 
that a payment of approximately $30,000 could be 
made. To finance the time lag and performance 
risk inherent to PFS contracting, a potential lead 
contractor could choose to arrange SIB financing. 
Roca’s response to the RFR was created in partnership 
with Third Sector and guided by the eight key criteria 
outlined in the introduction. These criteria provided 
valuable organizational and conceptual learning for 
both Roca and Third Sector, revealing the challenges 
and complexity of preparing a service provider to 
participate in this social finance innovation. “There 
are two fundamental ways to approach feasibility 
design of these Pay for Success opportunities” George 
Overholser, Co-Founder and CEO of Third Sector, 
commented. “The first is a multi-organization, 
collective action approach, combining several 
interventions together to try and move the needle 
against a social goal. In this case, you can harness 
the power of collective action, but may not be 
building upon evidence-based practices unless the 
organizations have collaborated in a proven model 
before. The second is to build upon the programs 
of one or two particularly strong, evidence-based 
providers to achieve a contract’s outcome metrics. We 
believe that both approaches can be successful as long 
as evidence of outcomes and evaluation are equally 
rigorous.” Roca, with its proven model and ability 
to serve a large target population, is an example of a 
strong sole provider model of intervention design for 
social innovation financing.
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“For each foregone incarceration achieved, the State estimated that a 
payment of approximately $30,000 could be made.”
Government Leadership
Before investing time and effort in the PFS/SIB 
opportunity, Roca staff, Board and supporters visited 
with government officials and assessed the political 
landscape to ensure that the Commonwealth was 
committed to follow through with what appeared to 
be a new and complex process.  Several observations 
led them to conclude that the opportunity was indeed 
a real one:  the Governor had expressed his clear 
support, the Secretary of Administration and Finance 
had announced his intention to be a major driver, 
the Boston Globe had covered the story positively 
on its front page, many of the officials throughout 
Roca’s government network were both aware of 
and supportive of the initiative, and government 
officials had demonstrated interest in Roca’s key 
competency area.  On this basis, and with Board-level 
commitment, Roca decided to move forward with 
exploring and responding to the RFR.
Social Needs That Are Unmet, 
High-Priority And Large-Scale
Roca’s next step was to examine the specific social 
needs the organization addressed, and to affirm that 
those needs were indeed significant in the larger 
Commonwealth context. The United States is one of 
the countries with the highest rate of incarceration 
per capita in the world - with 2.3 million, or 1 in 100, 
of its adults behind bars at any given time. States 
spend over $51 billion each year on corrections with 
prisons accounting for the majority of that cost. Over 
the past 20 years prison populations have doubled 
and the average length of incarceration has increased 
by nine months, or 35%, creating an additional 
$10 billion in costs for states.7  Compared to other 
states, Massachusetts has a relatively low share of 
adults in prison or jail, but the 26,000 individuals 
Massachusetts incarcerates each year results in more 
than $500 million in costs.8 
In 2008, studies by the Pew Center for the States found 
that it cost $130.16 per day, on average, to incarcerate 
an individual in Massachusetts .9 Based on this figure, 
a full year of incarceration would cost approximately 
$47,500.  Assuming an average young person aging 
out of Massachusetts’s Department of Youth Services 
(DYS) or Probation who is incarcerated as an adult 
would be sentenced to 12 to 18 months in prison, the 
twelve to eighteen month incarceration cost for this 
young person to the Commonwealth would range 
from $47,508 to $71,263. These costs are only those 
attributed to a first incarceration.  The Pew Center 
for the States further explains that between 2004 and 
2007, 42.2% of adults released from incarceration 
recidivated within three years, meaning that the costs 
of individuals re-entering the justice system could 
reach over $100 million.10 11   
In the RFR, the Commonwealth projected that 11,000 
young people would age out of DYS and Probation in 
Massachusetts over a four-year period. The RFR also 
indicated that, in the absence of new interventions, 
55% of these young people will be reincarcerated 
Assessing 
Roca Against 
Eight PFS Criteria
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7  The Pew Center for the States. Time Served. The High Cost, Low Returns of Longer Prison Terms. (2012).
8  The Pew Center for the States. 1 in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections in Massachusetts. (2011).
9  The Pew Center for the States.  1 in 31:  The Long Reach of American Corrections in Massachusetts. (2011).
10  Pew Center for the States.  “State of Recidivism:  The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons.” (April 2011), p. 10.
11  Of those released from incarceration, 33% were reincarcerated for a new crime and 9% were reincarcerated for a technical violation.  It should 
also be noted that between 1999 and 2007 when the Pew Center for the States conducted this study, recidivism rates in Massachusetts increased 
by 10.7%. (Source Pew/ASCA Recidivism Survey). The actual budgetary savings from reducing the number of prisoners could be much lower than 
$47,500 because there are fixed costs that could not be eliminated without closing entire facilities.
within three years.12 Since these individuals are 
aging out of supportive services, there are currently 
few to no government resources directed at this 
population, and programs and services are ad hoc 
and uncoordinated to serve those at highest risk of 
incarceration.
Roca and Third Sector’s counterfactual analysis (see 
section on Administrative Data) revealed that there 
would be 1,538 young people that fit Roca’s service 
model and geographic reach with a high-likelihood 
of recidivating. Should these “deep end” individuals, 
many with a greater than 55% re-offending rate, 
recidivate they would create an estimated $100 
million in incarceration costs to Massachusetts. 
Roca focuses intensively on these low-income young 
people who are in the deep end: gang and court 
involved, school dropouts, and teen parents who 
are disconnected from social institutions that might 
otherwise provide support, protection and pathways 
to employment.  Clearly, if the Commonwealth’s 
goal is to reduce rates of incarceration, and the 
accompanying costs, this deep-end population is 
a critical and viable group to target.  Based on the 
estimated $100 million per year cost of the problem, 
and on Roca’s keen insights into the lives of young 
people in the deep-end, Roca and Third Sector 
concluded that the Massachusetts RFR did focus on a 
significant and challenging social need that could be 
addressed with Roca’s Intervention Model. 
Target Populations That Are 
Well-Defined And Can Be 
Measured With Scientific Rigor
The Massachusettts RFR identified young people 
“aging-out” of government systems such as Youth 
Services and Probation as the target population. 
While this population was reasonably well defined 
and measureable, Roca and Third Sector concluded 
that a sharper definition would be required to better 
identify young people with the greatest need of 
support services. PFS contracts have the potential 
for greater success when programmatic efforts and 
evaluations of impact can be mapped clearly to a 
specific population.
Since Massachusetts Office of Public Safety (EOPSS) 
data indicate that young men comprise 95% of the 
incarcerated population and have higher recidivism 
rates,12 Roca suggested further defining the target 
population as: young men being discharged from 
DYS or juvenile probation who demonstrate a 
strong propensity for violence, crime and/or adult 
incarceration.  Roca proposed to work with DYS and 
juvenile probation to determine individuals with the 
highest likelihood of being incarcerated as adults. 
Specifically Roca proposed a focus on young men 
with high-end misdemeanor and/or felony charges 
in their arrest records who fall into a Grid Level 4 or 
higher as defined by DYS13 . Roca would also focus on 
young people convicted at age 16 or older in the adult 
system, while younger individuals would continue 
to be served under DYS and juvenile probation. 
“Should these ‘deep end’ individuals, many with a greater than 55% re-
offending rate, recidivate they would create an estimated $100 million in 
incarceration costs to Massachusetts.” 
13
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12  “Frequently Asked Questions about the DOC”. Executive Office of Public Safety and Security. August 2012. Available: http://www.mass.gov/
eopss/agencies/doc/faqs-about-the-doc.html
13  MA Department of Youth Services Grid 3 includes charges such as felony B&E and felony larceny.  Grid 4 includes charges such as assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon, armed robbery, and distributing cocaine.  Grid 5 includes charges such as armed assault and robbery and at-
tempted murder.  Grid 6 includes home invasion and murder.  Depending on the number of young people projected to be in each level, Roca may 
include those with Grid Level 3 offenses as well.
Note:  this focus has been designed to serve those 
most at risk of re-incarceration.  Those at less risk of 
incarceration would not receive the intervention as 
part of the proposed project.
Roca proposed to coordinate services for the highest 
risk young men who are aging out based on DYS or 
Juvenile Probation regulations.  Roca would also 
work with young men who are charged as youthful 
offenders, and age out at 21; however, in working 
with this group Roca would seek to begin developing 
relationships pre-discharge.
Another recommendation was the need to exclude 
certain young people from what would be defined 
as the target population.  For example, among aged-
out youth, Roca is not able to serve sex offenders, 
arsonists, and individuals with mental health issues 
that make them unable to respond to cognitive-
behavioral interventions.  A workable PFS contract 
would need to be able to exclude these individuals 
from analyses of impact.  
This highly defined target population falls directly 
in line with Roca’s overall service population.  Roca’s 
Intervention Model focused on 17-24 year old men in 
crisis and on the streets, particularly those involved 
Roca focuses intensively on these low-income young people who are in the deep end: gang and court involved, 
school dropouts, and teen parents who are disconnected from social institutions that might otherwise provide 
support, protection and pathways to employment.
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with Massachusetts’s criminal justice system. Roca 
chooses to focus on this group because it is the 
group that has most often been underserved or 
neglected by public and private institutions, with 
the exception of the criminal justice system, and is 
the group responsible for the majority of violence in 
Massachusetts’ cities. 
To maximize focus, Roca used its RFR response to 
recommend that the Commonwealth employ the 
“risk principle”.  According to the Crime and Justice 
Institute, “the risk principle identifies who to target 
for the most intensive of services and programming. 
Specifically, limited resources should be directed 
to those at highest risk for involvement in the 
criminal justice system. Further, higher risk clients 
should receive the greatest dosage of treatment and 
intervention. This principle is of critical importance 
given the serious constraints of limited budgets and 
working with growing community supervision and 
prison and jail populations.”14  Interventions that 
focus on a population that has a high likelihood 
of re-offending, being convicted of more serious 
offenses and returning to prison multiple times 
have the potential to generate more significant cost 
savings if total incarceration days for this group can 
be reduced. For lower risk groups, convictions are 
less serious, result in less incarceration time, and 
therefore less savings to Government if those types 
of incarcerations are reduced. As outlined earlier, the 
“PFS contracts have the potential for greater success when 
programmatic efforts and evaluations of impact can be 
mapped clearly to a specific population.”
Governments should pay for programs that 
actually improve lives, and not for results that 
would have happened anyway.
To measure true impact, an evaluation 
design is developed which is able to discern 
the effect of the program when compared to 
what would have happened in the absence 
of the intervention. This is often called a 
“counterfactual” because it considers whether 
or not, in the case of a juvenile justice program, 
those treated would actually commit a crime if 
they had not participated in the program.
Counterfactuals are also key to help identify 
“deep end” youth most in need of services 
versus those who would succeed without 
outside assistance.
What is a Counterfactual?
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14  Bechtel, Kristin and Barbara A. Pierce, MPPM.  “An Overview of What Works in Correctional Interventions.”  Crime and Justice Institute 
(January 2011).
cost savings in reducing the amount of more serious 
sentences could be between $47,508 to $71,263 per 
incarcerated individual over a twelve to eighteen 
month period.
Multiple studies and meta-analyses15  have repeatedly 
shown that programming that focuses on lower risk 
individuals or mixes high and low risk groups actually 
increases rates of recidivism for the lower risk client. 
16  Programs that adhered to the risk principle were 
able to reduce recidivism by 19 percent, whereas 
programming that served mixed risk groups had a 
Roca and Third Sector proposed serving three targeted geographic areas which would result in Roca 
reaching 42% of the total population of young people aging out of DYS and/or juvenile probation. 
16
Social Innovation Financing Case Study: Preparing for Pay for Success Opportunities
15  A meta-analysis is a summary of existing studies. The finding from a meta-analysis is commonly referred to as the treatment effect and is 
often presented as a correlation. Larger and positive correlations suggest that a better outcome was produced by the program or intervention 
being evaluated.
16  Andrews, D.A. Zinger, I. Hoge, R.D., Bonta, J., Gendreau, P., & Cullen, F.T. (1990).  Does correctional treatment work?  A clinically relevant 
and psychologically informed meta-analysis.  Criminology, 8, 369-404; Andrews, D.A. & Dowden, C. (1999).  A meta-analytic investigation into 
effective correctional intervention for female offenders.  Forum on Corrections Research, 11, 18-21.; Dowden, C. & Andrews, D.A. (1999a). What 
works for female offenders: A meta-analytic review.  Crime and Delinquency, 45, 438-45; Dowden, C. & Andrews, D.A. (1999b).  What works in 
young offender treatment: A meta-analysis.  Forum on Corrections Research, 11, 21-24; Dowden, C. & Andrews, D.A. (1999a).  What works for 
female offenders: A meta-analytic review.  Crime and Delinquency, 45, 438-452; Dowden, C. & Andrews, D.A. (1999b).  What works in young 
offender treatment: A meta-analysis.  Forum on Corrections Research, 11, 21-24; Lipsey, M.W. & Wilson, D.B. (1998).  Effective intervention for 
serious juvenile offenders: A synthesis of research.  In R. Loeber & D. Farrington (Eds.), Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors 
and Successful Interventions.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Lowenkamp, C.T., Latessa, E.J., & Holsinger, A. (2006).  The risk principle in action: 
What have we learned from 13,676 offenders and 97 correctional programs?  Crime and Delinquency, 52, 77-93; Lowenkamp, C.T. & Latessa, 
E.J. (2005).  Increasing the effectiveness of correctional programming through the risk principle: Identifying offenders for residential place-
ment.  Criminology & Public Policy, 4, 263-290; Lowenkamp, C., Smith, P., & Bechtel, K. (2007)  “Reducing the harm: Identifying appropriate 
programming for the low risk offender.” Corrections Today, December, 50-52; and, Latessa, E., Lowenkamp, C., Bechtel, K.  (2008)“Community 
Corrections Centers, Parolees, and Recidivism:  An Investigation into the Characteristics of Effective Reentry Programs in Pennsylvania.”
17  Lowenkamp, C.T. & Latessa, E.J. (2005).  Increasing the effectiveness of correctional programming through the risk principle: Identifying 
offenders for residential placement.  Criminology & Public Policy, 4, 263-290.
four percent increase in recidivism.  Findings from a 
large halfway house study conducted in Ohio suggest 
that intensive programming for higher risk offenders 
decreased recidivism by 10 to 30 percent. Yet, these 
same programs consistently increased recidivism for 
the lower risk offenders while also being much more 
costly to provide.17 
To help confirm that the targeting could work from 
a practical standpoint, Roca conducted meetings 
with various long-standing partners18  and was able 
to compile a zip-code level count of young people 
aging out of the Department of Youth Services and 
Probation.  These counts were overlaid onto Roca’s 
geographical service area to confirm there was a 
strong degree of overlap in service delivery capacity. 
In other words, Roca was looking to ensure that the 
geographic areas it proposed to serve would address 
at least 40% of the young people aging out across 
the Commonwealth.  At the same time, it became 
clear that adding an additional site in Boston may 
strengthen Roca’s ability to serve more young people 
and deliver against the RFR goals, in this or another 
Massachusetts geography. 
Using information from DYS included in the RFR, 
Roca and Third Sector proposed serving three targeted 
geographic areas which would result in Roca reaching 
42% of the total population of young people aging 
out of DYS and/or juvenile probation. The targeted 
municipalities (Chelsea, Boston and Springfield, 
MA) were selected because they reflected some of 
the most heavily impacted communities across the 
Commonwealth, and, at the same time, would allow 
for Roca’s place-based model to be implemented with 
fidelity (i.e., all young people could effectively engage 
in programming in one of Roca’s three proposed 
facilities). With the target population and locations 
defined, the next step became understanding how 
a population would be referred to the program and 
how outcomes would be tracked using existing 
government administrative data. 
Proven Outcomes From 
Administrative Data That Is 
Credible And Readily Available 
In A Cost Effective Means
In the RFR, the Commonwealth required that 
responders:
“Propose appropriate metrics for assessing the 
success of the program model and describe how the 
necessary data could be acquired… The State will 
work with the intermediary and service providers 
to select appropriate performance metrics. Data on 
arraignments, convictions, and incarceration spells 
are all potentially available.”
In its response, Roca recommended that 
incarceration, arrest, pre-conviction and sentencing 
Issues of “creaming,” the act of serving 
individuals who are less likely to commit 
crimes and are therefore easier to serve, can 
be dealt with effectively by using an “intent to 
treat” experimental frame.  For example, Roca 
and Third Sector proposed that Roca’s impact 
be evaluated based on the incarceration 
outcomes for all high-propensity youth in 
Roca’s service area, including youth that were 
not enrolled into Roca’s program. Exhibit 2 
on p.19 traces hypothetical outcomes for the 
entire population of aged out young people, 
over a four-year period, and illustrates the 
underpinnings of a possible “intent to treat” 
evaluation design.
The ‘Creaming” Problem
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18  Roca is committed to shifting the trajectories of not only our young people, but of all the institutions in a young person’s life—schools, local 
government, agencies and organizations—which are just as influential to the needs and growth of a young person as Roca.  Recognizing this, Roca 
has created partnerships with these institutions, opened the lines of communication, and each benefits from the other’s expertise. This can be 
seen through evolving and developing partnerships which include the cities of Chelsea, Revere, Boston, and Springfield; Hamden County Sheriff’s 
Department in Springfield, MA; Chelsea, Revere, and Springfield Police Departments; Chelsea Public Schools; The Federal District Court, Chelsea 
District Court and the Department of Probation; Massachusetts General Hospital / Roca health clinic; and more than 70 area employers. 
outcomes for success payments be tracked using 
government administrative data from the DYS and 
Probation systems.  These data systems were selected 
because they were credible, readily accessible, 
relatively standardized and cost effective. In addition, 
these systems allowed for historical look backs that 
could help define outcomes that would occur without 
the program. The use of administrative data rather 
than customized field surveys could greatly reduce 
the expense of conducting impact evaluations19 , and 
it would make it possible to measure impact for all 
young people in the target population (not just those 
enrolled in Roca), on an ongoing basis.  
Roca and Third Sector also proposed creating a 
secondary PFS metric tied to workforce participation. 
It was not clear from the RFR, however, whether 
the Commonwealth would be willing to offer PFS 
rewards for improvements in employment among 
the juvenile justice population. Roca believes that 
the surest way to keep a young adult out of prison is 
sustainable employment that puts them on a path to 
self-sufficiency. Roca partners with corporations and 
other employers to ensure full-time placement upon 
graduation from transitional employment. If agreed 
to as a success benchmark in the PFS benchmark, 
of the 66% who are projected to complete the two 
year intensive component of the model, Roca would 
commit to placing 75% in sustained employment. 
This additional metric was proposed by Roca because 
of their belief that it would strengthen outcomes for 
all parties. 
With the help of Third Sector, Roca contracted 
with Chapin Hall to provide expertise in evaluation 
designs that leverage administrative data as part 
of an independent program evaluation.  Chapin 
Hall, at the University of Chicago, is a leader in 
developing performance-based contracts for youth 
services nationwide.20  Roca’s work with Chapin Hall 
has focused on a growth and learning agenda with 
a specific emphasis on helping Roca demonstrate 
its Intervention Model as an evidence-based 
intervention. Together, Third Sector, Roca and 
Chapin Hall analyzed Roca’s historical program data 
to develop an understanding of Roca’s impact and 
then used that as a guide for navigating what happens 
to individuals not involved in the program.
The RFR required responders to suggest “a rigorous 
approach to establishing a credible counterfactual.” 
Rigorous evaluations are indeed essential to a 
successful PFS contract structure. Governments need 
to pay for programs that actually improve lives, and 
not for results that would have happened anyway.  To 
truly measure impact, the evaluation design must 
be able to discern the effect of the program when 
compared to counterfactuals, or what would have 
happened in the absence of the intervention. 
Roca and Third Sector proposed that the evaluation 
methodology should employ models that rely on 
available administrative data to identify the specific 
young people who are most likely to be incarcerated. 
If Roca’s program could be targeted towards young 
people with a high counterfactual propensity for 
incarceration (a high likelihood of going to jail), its 
“Roca’s Intervention Model is based on the implementation of a 
combination of evidence-based practices and has been touted as a national 
best practice by many Governments, advocates 
and service providers.”
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19 “Rigorous Program Evaluations on a Budget: How Low-Cost Randomized Controlled Trials Are Possible in Many Areas of Social Policy.” 
Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy. March 2012. Available at: http://coalition4evidence.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Rigorous-Program-
Evaluations-on-a-Budget-March-2012.pdf
20  For more information on Chapin Hall, please visit www.chapinhall.org.
programmatic efforts will be more likely to bring 
about a measureable reduction in incarcerations. 
Variables such as gender and severity of prior 
justice involvement could be used to identify a sub-
population that is significantly more likely to become 
incarcerated than the overall aging out population. 
Confident that a robust means of incorporating 
counterfactuals into the PFS measures of impact 
could be devised, Roca and Third Sector proposed 
three approaches to establishing a counterfactual in 
the RFR response. Each approach would be similarly 
cost-effective given the use of administrative data for 
the analysis. Additionally, these approaches are not 
mutually exclusive; one could design a program that 
integrates one, two, or all three approaches.
1. The first counterfactual approach involves a self-
to-self comparison.  Self-to-self counterfactual 
can be referred to as the historical comparison. 
It is an unfortunate fact that jail use tends to 
cluster in certain areas.  Changing utilization in 
these hot spots can have significant public health 
level benefits which go beyond incarceration to 
reduced policing costs and increased community 
safety if programs large enough to counteract 
the risks can be developed.  Detecting change 
involves establishing baseline utilization using 
historical data for comparison with data from 
the program.  At scale, a comparison can be 
used to detect whether the amount of jail used 
by residents within a community has changed 
relative to past patterns.  The statistical 
properties of these baseline/target/actual 
models are robust enough to detect meaningful 
change in what is often called a ‘difference-in-
difference’ framework.
2. The second approach to constructing a 
counterfactual involves a similar strategy except 
that the counterfactual is constructed from 
comparison sites that resemble the target site, 
with both sets of sites operating at the same time. 
This is a cross-site counterfactual.  The fact that 
the sites are operating simultaneously means 
that any unique effects of when the program is 
operating (e.g., economic downturns) generally 
affects both sites.  Sites can be randomized 
using cluster-randomized designs to achieve 
an even more robust design.  Cross-site and 
historical counterfactuals can be combined 
Exhibit 2: Constructing a Counterfactual to Estimate Potential Population for Roca
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to answer whether the rates of change in the 
utilization of jails proceeded in a comparable 
manner.  Again, there are a variety of ways to 
test the significance of the effects including a 
difference-in-difference approach.
3. Finally, the counterfactual can be constructed 
using random assignment. Random assignment 
is a practice in experimental design where 
participants have equal likelihood of being 
assigned to the group receiving the intervention 
or the non-intervention group. Random 
assignment can occur at the individual level, 
the neighborhood/cluster level, or both. 
Randomization of individuals already identified 
as deep-end can also be used in conjunction with 
the other approaches. Roca did voice concern 
that random assignment would mean denying 
care to individuals in need. With this concern 
in mind, Roca and Third Sector recognized that 
any approach to constructing a counterfactual 
would likely be a blend of the three different 
approaches. 
Exhibit 2, included in the RFR response, illustrates that 
there are 11,000 young people that the State projects 
will age out of DYS and Probation in Massachusetts 
over a four-year period. Roca and Third Sector 
assumed that, based on the information included in 
the RFR, in the absence of a new intervention, 55% 
of those young people would be incarcerated within 
2 years.  Thus, at the Massachusetts population level, 
the counterfactual is 6,050 incarcerations.
Using DYS data to analyze the cities within Roca’s 
implementation area, the geographic targeting box 
illustrates the number of young people estimated to 
be aging out in Roca’s service area. This covers 42% 
-- 4,620 -- of the youth that will age out.  With no 
additional data to suggest otherwise, Roca and Third 
Exhibit 3: Participants Served in Basic Transitional Employment
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Sector assumed that these youth have the same 
likelihood of being incarcerated as those that are not 
in Roca’s service area.  
Roca and Third Sector then focused further on 
the highest risk young people by asserting that a 
model might be constructed, based on historical 
administrative data, which predicts a likelihood of 
being incarcerated for each youth on the list of 4,620 
in Roca’s service area. It was assumed that the model 
would be powerful enough to identify the one-third of 
this population (1,538 youth) that has a 60% average 
(counterfactual) likelihood of being incarcerated 
within two years. 
The chart illustrates those young people who are 
successfully recruited into the program and assessed 
to fill a proposed 900 programming slots across 
four years of enrollments.  In the absence of data to 
suggest otherwise, Roca and Third Sector assumed 
similar 60% counterfactual propensities for this 
group as well.  (Roca management believed that 
their intake system would actually result in a served 
population that has a higher than 60% counterfactual 
propensity).21 
Lastly, the three boxes to the right of the chart illustrate 
(in yellow) what actually happens due to Roca’s 
intervention:  Among those who stay in the program, 
none go to jail, although 316 would have gone.  This 
is because in order remain in as a participant in the 
program the individual cannot be incarcerated. 
Among those who attrite, an estimated 262 go to 
jail, although 309 would have gone in absence of the 
intervention. This is the projected “Roca effect” of 
having a participant partially complete the program. 
In other words, based on a 60% counterfactual, this 
graphic illustrates a possible impact of 360 foregone 
incarcerations among individuals (309-262= 47+316= 
363) successfully recruited into the program. 
 
By creating a statistical model that could use data 
such as gender and prior arrest records to predict each 
young person’s likelihood of becoming incarcerated 
in the future, Roca proposed a critical tool needed to 
take a step towards a more targetable and measurable 
population.  With this risk assessment model in 
place, it would be possible to identify and assign 
specific deep end young people to Roca’s program in 
a scientific way that would lend itself well to impact 
evaluation. Essentially, this was a way to ensure that 
Roca’s efforts to reduce incarcerations would not be 
diluted by serving young people who were not likely 
to become incarcerated. Roca’s efforts would also be 
more cost-effective, as serving the deep end group 
means the intervention needed to serve just two 
individuals to ensure a success payment, versus 3, 4 
or more if the counterfactual was lower.
Exhibit 4: Roca Intermediate Outcomes
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21  Wulczyn, F. (2007). Monitoring Child Welfare Programs:  Performance Improvement in a CQI Context.  Chapin Hall at the University of 
Chicago:  Chicago, IL.
Several meetings with government officials and data 
experts were required to assess the current state of the 
Commonwealth’s administrative data.  With the help 
of these experts, Roca and Third Sector concluded 
that the data indeed exists. In its RFR response, Roca 
and Third Sector stressed the importance of the 
development of risk assessment models as a necessary 
pre-condition to successful PFS contracting.
An Intervention That 
Was Likely To Work
Roca has interwoven two decades of experiential 
knowledge, internal evaluations, and evidence-based 
practices from cognitive-behavioral therapy to 
solidify a program into what is referred to as the 
High-Risk Youth Intervention Model. This model 
provides two years of intensive programming and 
two years of follow-up. The intervention relies on 
intensive relationships between adults and high-
risk youth, as well as targeted programming (i.e., life 
skills, education, and employment).  Young people 
develop the necessary skills to reduce violence and 
create positive behavioral changes, which contribute 
to reductions in incarcerations and increased job 
placement and retention.   The model has four key 
attributes:
Exhibit 5: Roca’s Intervention Model
“The core of Roca’s High-Risk Youth Intervention Model is the 
Transformational Relationship (TR). This relationship is not a 
friendship—it is more profound—effectively intentional, 
and mutually respectful.” 
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1. Relentless Outreach And Follow Up: Youth 
workers build relationships by finding young 
people where they are, learning where they hang 
out, knocking on their doors, and continuously 
circling the neighborhood in the infamous 
Roca vans. It is the relentlessness of a youth 
worker who shows up day after day, no matter 
what, that awakens hope in a young person. A 
youth worker must relentlessly reconnect with a 
young person who periodically rejects them and 
refuses to engage in programming.  This pattern 
is crucial to the process and must happen 
continuously throughout the relationship. 
While a young person may show up at Roca 
three times in one week, they may just as likely 
refuse to come back the following week. It is the 
youth worker’s responsibility to track down that 
young person and reengage him.
2. Transformational Relationships (Intensive 
Case Management):  Roca knows that when 
a young person is re-engaged through positive 
and intensive relationships, he can go on to 
gain competencies in life skills, education 
and employment. Therefore, at the core of 
the High-Risk Youth Intervention Model 
is the Transformational Relationship (TR). 
Their relationship is not a friendship—it is 
more profound—effectively intentional, and 
mutually respectful. Youth workers are trained 
in motivational interviewing and cognitive 
behavioral strategies preparing them to use 
their self effectively to guide and support young 
people.
3. Stage-Based Programming: Roca engages 
young people where they are in the stages 
of change cognitively and behaviorally.22 By 
applying this evidence-based framework in 
the program delivery, young people move 
along a pathway of education, pre-vocational 
training, life skills, transitional employment 
and unsubsidized employment opportunities. 
By matching programming to a young person’s 
stage of change, instead of placing all young 
people into a one-size-fits-all curriculum, Roca 
is driving this population, who will not move in 
a straight trajectory, toward positive outcomes.   
4. Work With Engaged Institutional Partners: 
The institutions that are in a young person’s 
life—schools, local government, agencies, and 
organizations—are just as influential to the 
needs and growth of a young person as Roca. 
Roca’s integrated delivery model establishes 
open lines of communication and benefits from 
the expertise of partner organizations. 
 
Roca’s Intervention Model is based on the 
implementation of a combination of evidence-
based practices and has been touted as a national 
best practice by many Governments, advocates and 
service providers. Given the intensive nature of Roca’s 
Intervention Model, it was important that Roca has 
been preparing itself to scale for the past several years 
and the Massachusetts RFR directly aligns with Roca’s 
Strategic Business Plan.  Through this business plan, 
Roca proposes to focus the continued delivery of its 
Intervention Model to address the needs of 17-24 year 
old young men who demonstrate a strong propensity 
for violence, crime and/or adult incarceration, who 
are either: 1) aging out of the juvenile justice or 
juvenile probation systems; 2) connected with the 
adult justice system; or, 3) are high risk youth from 
the community being served. Roca is in an early-
stage growth for impact that meets the criteria of 
“organizations that have demonstrated a significant 
level of effectiveness and are increasing their capacity 
for scale.”23  A Pay for Success program was viewed 
as an opportunity for Roca to scale sustainably its 
intervention to new geographies.
23
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22  Roca has taken Prochaska’s stages of change and adapted them for a very high-risk youth development model.  Backed by evidence from 
multiple disciplines (e.g. substance abuse, medicine, harm reduction, etc.), promoting young people through the stages of change allows them to 
develop the intrinsic skills, desires, and capacities to successfully move towards safety and self-sufficiency.
23  As defined by the Social Impact Exchange and found at http://www.socialimpactexchange.org/bpc_overview.cfm, organizations prepared for 
early stage growth:  1) offer a clear understanding of key program elements and processes required for scaling; 2) have piloted in at least one site for 
a minimum of one year; 3) have collected data [inputs, activities, outputs] and documented early results indicating effectiveness and the potential 
for impact at scale, using data from the actual implementation, not general research data that states a certain method works; and 4) have a well 
defined strategy for further expansion. 
Proven Service Providers That 
Are Prepared To Scale 
With Quality
Although Roca’s program design was clearly well 
suited to the goals of the Massachusetts RFR, it was 
nevertheless important to demonstrate that Roca was 
fully capable of scaling and executing the proposed 
program design in a way that achieved impact. As 
mentioned in the previous section, Roca was well 
prepared to scale. The organization had a clear 
understanding of how key program elements would 
need to scale, had piloted in a site for at least a year, 
had collected data to document program efficacy and 
had a well defined strategy, as part of Roca’s Strategic 
Business Plan, outlining expansion. Roca shared the 
following data from FY12 Performance Indicators and 
Outcomes for the primary target of 17-24 year old 
high risk young men involved in the criminal justice 
system as evidence of program impact specific to the 
target population proposed in the RFR.24  
Of the 409 young men served:
• 178 had been enrolled prior to FY12.
• 231 were new enrollments in FY12.
Of the 409 young men served in Roca’s 
Intervention Model:
• 298 remain actively engaged.
• 111 were dismissed.
The ultimate impact of Roca’s Intervention Model 
is also assessed by examining how well program 
participants do once they are no longer engaged 
through the intensive parts of the model (Phase 
1 & Phase 2). While in Phase 3, young people are 
supported in their ongoing development and to 
participate in formal certifications, educational 
programming as needed, job retention support and 
replacement as needed, and support for long-term 
goal planning and career development. 
In FY12, 39 primary population participants 
graduated to a Phase 3:25  
• 79% were retaining unsubsidized employment 
placements.
• 70% had continued educational gains.
• 90% had no new arrests. 
• 100% had no new technical violations.
Of the 409 young men served in 
Roca’s Intervention Model:
• 298 remain actively engaged.
• 111 were dismissed.
• 80% of all participants were engaged in 
stage based programming.
• 172 unduplicated participants were served in 
Transitional Employment.
• 161 were served in Basic Transitional 
Employment.
           - Of those who successfully 
        completed Basic Transitional  
        Employment, 86% have retained 
        employment.
• 31 were served in Advance Transitional 
Employment.
         - Of those who successfully 
       completed Advanced Transitional 
       Employment, 75% have retained 
       employment.
• 67% of young people placed in unsubsidized 
employment in FY12 were still working at 
the end of the fiscal year.
• 73% had no new arrests.
• 67% had no new technical violations.
Roca Highlights
24
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24  2012 Roca Outcomes Report.
25  2012 Roca Outcomes Report.
Most importantly for the PFS contract:
• Only 14% of those who had originally enrolled 
into the four-year program had become 
incarcerated within four years.
• This compared favorably with the State’s 
estimated 55% counterfactual probability of 
incarceration, had these young people not 
enrolled into Roca.
There was also a need to demonstrate that Roca and its 
intermediary partners were proven in their ability to 
raise the SIB capital that would be needed to finance 
the PFS contract.  In their RFR responses, all three 
organizations (Roca and intermediary partners Third 
Sector and New Profit Inc.) were able to document 
prior results of having raised capital that was well in 
excess of the approximately $10 million that would 
be required. New Profit, a venture philanthropy and 
portfolio organization based in Cambridge, MA, had 
raised over $120 million to invest in high-performing 
nonprofits. And two members of the Third Sector 
team had helped raise over $320 million in growth 
capital for nonprofits while working at Nonprofit 
Finance Fund Capital Partners.
Safeguards To Protect the 
Well-Being of 
Populations Served
A critical benefit of PFS contracting is its focus on 
outcomes and thus its movement away from contract 
terms that specify the programmatic design that 
service providers must follow. On the other hand, 
Government must nevertheless continue to ensure 
safeguards for the target population, and that services 
are not withheld.
For twenty-five years, Roca has partnered closely 
with government officials in the Justice and Health 
and Human Services departments to implement 
strict monitoring and accountabilities designed to 
ensure the safety of the young people they serve. 
Roca has clearly identified processes and protocols 
for intervening in and managing crises and critical 
incidents internally and externally (flow charts, 
protocols, processes) covering fights, weapons, 
injuries, etc.  As part of this protocol, Roca has young 
people sign safety contracts that clearly define what 
is not allowable in the building in order to maintain 
a safe space for everyone and the consequences that 
could occur if the contract is not followed. All of 
these elements made Roca well positioned to provide 
sufficient and institutionalized programmatic 
safeguards. 
In addition, Roca and Third Sector proposed that the 
data collection plan and evaluation design go before 
an Institutional Review Board (IRB).  Because the RFR 
contemplated changing a public benefit program, 
the IRB would provide oversight so that everyone 
understands the ethical obligations in clinical 
settings.  In addition, the real-time monitoring 
proposal would provide enough feedback to know 
whether, as a result of the program, risk to the served 
population is increasing rather than decreasing as 
intended.  Should that happen, program developers 
face an informed choice regarding whether to 
continue moving forward.
Cost Effective Programs That 
Can Demonstrate Fiscal Savings 
For Government
In the Massachusetts RFR, the State made it clear 
that it would not pursue PFS contracting unless 
fiscal savings in the costs of incarceration would 
equal or outweigh the fiscal expense of paying out 
PFS rewards.  Then, as guidance to responders, it 
expressed willingness by Government to pay $30,000 
for each two-year period of foregone incarcerations 
that could be achieved among the target population.
This presented a challenge to Roca and its intermediary 
partners, as the partnership estimated the cost to 
serve each Roca enrollee amounts to almost $20,400, 
cumulatively, across a four-year intervention.  Thus, 
the only way Roca would be able to recoup its 
expenses from a $30,000 PFS payment per avoided 
incarceration would be if almost every young person 
they served resulted in a forgone incarceration.  More 
specifically, this would require that:
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a) Almost every young person in the target 
population was destined to become incarcerated 
in the absence of a Roca intervention (a higher 
than 55% counterfactual)
b) The program would have an almost 100% success 
rate in helping young people avoid incarceration
Roca and Third Sector concluded quickly that an 
alternative approach would need to be proposed. 
Their insight was that Roca’s program was designed 
to produce four-year (not two-year) periods of non-
incarceration.  On that basis, they suggested that 
the Commonwealth should be able to afford a PFS 
success payment of $50,000 rather than $30,000 as 
they would be measuring success over twice the time 
frame.
They then conducted detailed research and 
analysis to become satisfied that a $50,000 success 
payment, combined with their anticipated rate of 
programmatic success, and adding the full costs 
of the intermediary partnership and SIB financing 
expense, would be enough to cover the full cost of 
the intervention for all individuals served, whether 
ultimately successful or not. 
While in Phase 3, young people are supported in their ongoing development and to participate in 
formal certifications, educational programming as needed, job retention support and replacement as 
needed, and support for long-term goal planning and career development. 
Social Innovation Financing Case Study: Preparing for Pay for Success Opportunities
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Program Design & 
Key  Assumptions
Much of Roca and Third Sector’s work together 
focused on identifying and solidifying the program 
design and key assumptions that would inform the 
project’s financial structure and feasibility. The 
assumptions would become the central starting 
points for negotiations with the State and investors 
and therefore required significant attention. The RFR 
response outlined the following design assumptions:
• Target Population:  “High-risk” youth, ages 
17 to 24. Select individuals with the highest 
propensity to become incarcerated as 
demonstrated by established assessment tools. 
• Counterfactual:  Among the targeted 
population, a 60% counterfactual likelihood of 
becoming incarcerated within four years was 
assumed.
• Cohort Size:  900 individuals.
• Program Period:  Six years (four years of service 
delivery and two years follow-on evaluation).
• Targeted Outcome:  Program participants 
avoid recidivism for 48 continuous months 
after being released from the juvenile justice 
system. A recommendation was made to 
consider using “bed days of incarceration” as an 
alternative metric.
• Government Success Payments:  $50,000 paid 
per foregone incarceration, defined as two 
years out of prison post-aging out. Payments 
would begin two years after initiation of 
program delivery, which was estimated to 
be the time that impact could be detected 
between incarcerations expected and those 
actually observed in the Roca population. 
This payment level would have the potential 
to generate $18 million in Pay for Success 
payments.
Social Innovation Financing 
& Repayment
Roca and Third Sector evaluated a variety of financing 
options to see which had the best potential to support 
a successful program while also being realistic 
and feasible for project partners. It is important to 
remember that there are a myriad of ways to finance 
PFS using different combinations of investors, both 
philanthropic and return-seeking. 
In fact, one of the major draws of social innovation 
financing is its potential to attract dollars from 
mainstream capital markets, as evidenced by the 
recent New York City social impact bond project 
financed with a $9.6M loan by Goldman Sachs, in 
partnership with the Bloomberg Foundation.26  If the 
programs succeed in reducing recidivism by 10% or 
more, Goldman stands to earn profits of as much as 
$2.1M after eight years. The Bloomberg Foundation 
provided $7.2M in loan guarantee (also referred to as 
credit enhancement) for Goldman Sachs to limit the 
bank’s investment risk on its $9.6M loan.27 
Program Design
and
Key Assumptions
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26  For more information about the New York City Social Impact Bond, please visit the Nonprofit Finance Fund’s Learning Hub at: http://payforsuc-
cess.org/. New York Times announcement available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/nyregion/goldman-to-invest-in-new-york-city-jail-
program.html
For the purposes of the RFR response to the 
Commonwealth, Roca and Third Sector projected 
that the total financing required for this project 
would be between $15-$20 million. Roca and Third 
Sector expected that the structure would be revised 
and changed during negotiations with the State and 
investors. 
Since there is not a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
financing PFS, Roca and Third Sector proposed 
a structure that would allow for flexibility during 
contract negotiations as well as include a diverse 
set of investors with differing levels of capacity, risk 
tolerance, and return on capital requirements. 
• First Tranche: SIB investors provide initial 
working capital to cover feasibility stage work 
and cash requirements for the first several years 
of operations. This tranche of investors would 
experience a 100% return of capital, plus a 2-4% 
risk premium, through net PFS payments (after 
service delivery costs are paid) and would be the 
first tranche to be reimbursed.
• Second Tranche: Additional investment 
from philanthropic grant capital is used to 
provide funding for the early years of program 
operations. This tranche is composed of 
recoverable grants that would experience a 100% 
return of capital, but no risk premium, through 
net PFS payments (after service delivery costs 
are paid). In addition, this tranche would be 
“second loss”, only to be re-paid after return 
seeking SIB investors received PFS payments.
• Third Tranche: Additional investment in the 
form of non-recoverable philanthropic grant 
capital that would serve as “first loss” capital, 
or capital to re-pay return-seeking investors 
in the event that the project did not achieve 
anticipated outcomes.   
• Government PFS Payments: PFS payments 
would commence in year three – only if 
outcomes are achieved. These payments would 
be used to fund service delivery costs as well as 
reimburse investors as necessary.
Potential Outcome Summary 
Based on RFR Proposal
• Out of those served via the PFS, the initiative 
anticipates reducing the number of young people 
that become incarcerated from 540 expected 
incarcerations to 180 actual incarcerations.  
• Under a $50,000 payment per foregone 
incarceration plan, total government PFS 
payments would be $18.0 million. Payments are 
made in years three to six of the six year project 
period.
• Potential net savings for Massachusetts (after 
reimbursing under the PFS payments) range 
between $9.4 - $23.4 million over the six-
year project based on historical costs and 
performance outcomes. 
• Out of those served via the PFS, the 
initiative anticipates reducing the number 
of young people that become incarcerated 
from 540 expected incarcerations to 180 
actual incarcerations. 
• Under a $50,000 payment per foregone 
incarceration plan, total government PFS 
payments are $18 million. Payments are 
made in years three to six of the six year 
project period.
• Potential net savings for Massachusetts (after 
reimbursing under the PFS payments) range 
between $9.4 million- $23.4 million costs and 
performance outcomes.28
Outcome Summary
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27  “I’ll put $2.4 Million on Recidivism to Fall”. The Economist August 6, 2012. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2012/08/social-impact-bonds
28  Based on avoided per diem costs for twelve month and eighteen month incarceration periods.  Cost per day derived from The Pew Center for the 
States. 1 in 31:  The Long Reach of American Corrections in Massachusetts. (2011).
On August 1, 2012, Roca was selected as lead service 
provider for the Massachusetts juvenile justice 
project, and Third Sector, in partnership with New 
Profit Inc., was selected as lead intermediary. Since 
the announcement, Roca and Third Sector have begun 
negotiations with the State to revise and finalize terms 
and conditions of the contract, including the target 
population, outcome metrics and success payments, 
and financing requirements. 
As Pay for Success continues to gain momentum 
across the country, service providers will need to 
understand that accessing the PFS opportunity is 
only possible by thorough, thoughtful and dedicated 
feasibility work. Third Sector Capital Partners’ 
technical assistance work with Roca reveals the 
complexities and time required to enable a service 
provider to be a successful PFS candidate. As Molly 
Baldwin observed, “When Roca met Third Sector, 
we already knew what outcomes-based management 
meant. Over the nine months we have been working 
with them, Third Sector has taught us how to 
combine our commitment to impact with outcomes-
based financing to support our organization and a 
sustainable business model.” 
At Third Sector, we believe that the approach Roca 
took to evaluate the social innovation financing 
opportunity can be replicated and developed with 
other service organizations across the country. We 
look forward to sharing additional knowledge of our 
own experiences in this space and supporting other 
service providers interested in participating in PFS 
projects. 
Service Provider 
Engagement with 
Pay for Success
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“Over the nine months we have been working with them, Third 
Sector has taught us how to combine our commitment to impact 
with outcomes-based financing to support our organization and a 
sustainable business model.” - Molly Baldwin, Roca
About Us
At Third Sector Capital Partners, our mission is to accelerate America’s transition to a performance-driven 
social sector. We believe in the importance of bringing performance-driven social innovations to scale, in a way 
that is financially sustainable.
Founded in 2010, Third Sector Capital Partners is a nonprofit that collaborates with government, funders and providers 
to create Pay for Success (PFS) and Social Innovation Finance (SIF) solutions.
We bring proven experience in finance, project management, rigorous evaluation methodologies, and cross-sector 
collaboration to ensure our clients are educated, engaged and equipped to participate in PFS and SIF initiatives. Our 
services include: 
• Transaction Advisory Services: Program feasibility, program risk evaluation and partnership formation.
• Deal Construction: Financial structuring, capital raising, contract negotiations, vetting of partnership stakeholders.
• Post-Closing Intermediary Services: Project management, investor relations, evaluation advisory services.
• Education and Advocacy: Services and activities to advance the development of a performance-driven social sector.
Third Sector Capital Partners
www.thirdsectorcap.org
DISCLAIMER
ANY LOANS OR GRANTS REFERRED TO IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE NOT SECURITIES AND 
THE PROVISION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL 
OR THE SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY SECURITIES.  NO REPRESENTATIONS 
OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND ARE INTENDED OR SHOULD BE INFERRED WITH 
RESPECT TO THE ECONOMIC RETURN OR THE TAX CONSEQUENCES FROM THE 
LOANS OR GRANTS.  NO ASSURANCE CAN BE GIVEN THAT THE FINANCIAL OR SOCIAL 
OBJECTIVE WILL BE ACHIEVED.  PROSPECTIVE FUNDERS ARE NOT TO CONSTRUE 
THIS DOCUMENT AS LEGAL OR TAX ADVICE.  EACH PROSPECTIVE FUNDER SHOULD 
CONSULT ITS OWN COUNSEL, ACCOUNTANT AND OTHER ADVISERS FOR ADVICE 
CONCERNING THE VARIOUS LEGAL, TAX AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
RELATING TO ITS LOAN OR GRANT.
THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE BY THIRD SECTOR.
© Third Sector Capital Partners Inc., 2013. All Rights Reserved.
